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Causal theory of reference
Semantic reference
Speaker’s referencea b s t r a c t
Theories of reference are a crucial research topic in analytic philosophy. Since the publication of Kripke’s
Naming and Necessity, most philosophers have endorsed the causal/historical theory of reference. The
goal of this paper is twofold: (i) to discuss a method for testing experimentally the causal theory of ref-
erence for proper names by investigating linguistic usage and (ii) to present the results from two exper-
iments conducted with that method. Data collected in our experiments confirm the causal theory of
reference for people proper names and for geographical proper names. A secondary but interesting result
is that the semantic domain affects reference assignment: while with people proper names speakers tend
to assign the semantic reference, with geographical proper names they are prompted to assign the speak-
er’s reference.
 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction: philosophers’ reactions to experimental
semantics
A theory of reference for proper names answers the following
question:
(i) In virtue of what facts is an object o the bearer of the name
‘‘N” as used by a speaker S?
Since Saul Kripke published Naming and Necessity, most philoso-
phers have endorsed the causal theory of reference. According to
this theory, a speaker S refers to an object o by using a name ‘‘N”
when she is part of a communication chain that originated with
a baptism or a grounding of the name ‘‘N” into the object o and
through which information about the object o is transmitted. The
crucial point in opposition to the classical descriptivist theory of
reference is that the information that the speaker associates to
the name might be incomplete, i.e., not detailed enough to single
out the bearer of the name or even false of the bearer of the name.
In particular, it is not the fact that the speaker associates a true
identifying description of the bearer with the name that makes
the name refer to the bearer.
The first works in experimental semantics addressed the
methodological question concerning the evidence on which
philosophers rely to establish which theory of reference is true.Machery et al. (2004, 2009) and Mallon, Machery, Nichols, and
Stich (2009) have attacked the methodology of philosophers of lan-
guage by assuming that it is ultimately grounded on the evidential
role of intuitions.1 Philosophical theories of reference are correct to
the extent that they are confirmed by competent speakers’ referen-
tial intuitions. If a theory of reference says that in a given scenario, a
proper name ‘‘N” refers to an object o, then the theory is confirmed if
competent speakers have the intuition that in that scenario the
proper name ‘‘N” refers to the object o. If competent speakers have
the intuition that the proper name ‘‘N” does not refer to o, then
the theory is disconfirmed.
In Machery et al.’s view, philosophers of language endorse the
methodological principle called the method of cases,2 here reformu-
lated as follows with regard to question (i):
Themethod of cases: the correct philosophical theory of reference
for a proper name ‘‘N” is the theory that is best supported by the
intuitions that competent speakers have about ‘‘N”’s reference.
This methodological principle presumes that semantic intu-
itions be uniformly shared among speakers and across actual and
possible cases. Machery et al. (2004), Machery, Olivola, and de
Blanc (2009) questioned the truth of this presumption. First, they
noted that philosophers have exclusively relied on their own intu-
itions, i.e., theoreticians’ intuitions. Second, by means of an empir-d on the
2 F. Domaneschi et al. / Cognition 161 (2017) 1–9ical survey, they tried to show that semantic intuitions vary among
speakers of different linguistic and cultural communities. In a ser-
ies of experiments, they tested ordinary speakers’ referential intu-
itions in cases modelled after Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt story.3 In
Naming and Necessity, Kripke (1980) depicts a counterfactual sce-
nario in which Gödel is not the author of the theorem of the incom-
pleteness of arithmetic. Gödel stole the proof of the theorem from
Schmidt, the author of the theorem in the counterfactual scenario.
According to Kripke, in that scenario, a hypothetical speaker who
associated the unique description ‘‘the author of the theorem of
the incompleteness of arithmetic” with the name ‘‘Gödel” would still
refer to Gödel and not to Schmidt. In Machery et al.’s interpretation,
Kripke’s refutation of classical descriptivism relies on the evidence
that competent speakers share the intuition that in the counterfac-
tual scenario the name ‘‘Gödel” refers to Gödel.
Machery et al. claim to have proven that there is no such evi-
dence. They say that the empirical data they have collected show
that competent speakers in different linguistic communities (e.g.,
a group of Western participants and a group of Eastern Chinese
participants) do not share the intuition that the name ‘‘Gödel”
refers to Gödel in the counterfactual scenario. They conclude that
the philosophical methodology is severely flawed because it
employs the method of cases, which in turn presupposes the uni-
formity of referential intuitions among speakers. However, speak-
ers do not share the same referential intuitions. Consequently,
philosophical theories of reference are baseless with regard to
the kind of evidence that philosophers employ to support them.
Machery et al.’s experiments have generated two main strands4
of reactions from philosophers. Some commentators have strongly
rejected Machery et al.’s view that referential intuitions play a cru-
cial role in Kripke’s refutation of classical descriptivism. According
to Deutsch (2009, 2010, 2015), Ichikawa, Maitra, and Weatherson
(2011) and Martí (2014), Machery et al.’s attack of the methodology
in the philosophy of language originated from a mistaken interpreta-
tion of Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt story. These philosophers claim that
the evidence in favour of Kripke’s refutation of classical descrip-
tivism derives, not from polling philosophers’ or ordinary speakers’
referential intuitions, but from the error and ignorance argument
and the immunity from mistake argument. Hence, these philosophers
argue that the target of Machery et al.’s attack is misplaced.
Other philosophers agree that the polemic target of Machery
et al.’s empirical surveys is misplaced, but they are nonetheless
concerned with the challenge raised by experimentalists. Such
philosophers have taken seriously the idea that experiments may
have an evidential role in the philosophy of language. Devitt
(2011a, 2011b, 2015) and Martí (2009, 2014) have pointed out that
the experiments conducted by Machery et al. do not elicit the kind
of data that are relevant to the theory of reference. Devitt and
Martí’s objection is that Machery et al.’s tests invite participants
to think about how a hypothetical speaker uses a name, and they
prompt participants to reflect on how they think reference is deter-
mined. However, data on how participants think that reference is
determined are not relevant for philosophers of language who try
to explain it in virtue of what proper names refers to their bearers.
Asking participants to reflect on whether the character of the vign-3 The classic version of descriptivism that Kripke refutes in Naming and Necessity is
the view that names have their bearers semantically fixed by descriptions. The
descriptions are built with properties that speakers commonly attribute to the
bearers. For names like ‘‘Aristotle,” ‘‘Columbus,” ‘‘Einstein,” the properties generally
regard the great achievements of the individuals named by those names.
4 There is also a group of methodological objections claiming that Machery et al.’s
works fail to collect data on semantic intuitions because the task questions of the
tests can be understood ambiguously. Consequently, they may elicit intuitions about
the speaker’s reference or semantic reference or about the epistemic perspective of
the experimenter or the epistemic perspective of the characters in the vignettes. See
Ludwig (2007), Deutsch (2009), and Sytsma and Livengood (2011).ette uses the name ‘‘Gödel” to talk about Gödel or Schmidt may be
indicative – at the very best – of the participants’ inclinations
towards ways of theorising about reference determination, but it
does not reveal any aspect of the real phenomenon in which
philosophers are interested, namely reference determination itself.
Thus, although Devitt and Martí do consider as legitimate the
idea that philosophical theories of reference can be experimentally
tested, they argue that such theories should be tested not against
referential intuitions but against the reality of what referential
intuitions are about, i.e., linguistic usage. Experimental surveys
must be conducted on speakers’ linguistic performances, their pro-
duction and understanding of sounds and signs in communication
exchanges.
In the following section, we will develop Devitt and Martí’s
insight into a method for testing the causal theory of reference
for proper names. We will discuss a problem that the idea of test-
ing linguistic usage gives rise to. The problem stems from the
ambiguity between semantic reference and speaker’s reference.2. Testing linguistic usage: semantic reference vs. speaker’s
reference
Our research question is a conditional one: if one agrees that
experiments might have an evidential role in the philosophy of
language and accepts Devitt and Martí’s idea that experiments in
theory of reference must collect data about linguistic usage and
not about referential intuitions, then how can one test the causal
theory of reference? As soon as one starts addressing this question,
one faces a problem related to the distinction between semantic
reference and speaker’s reference. Let us elaborate on this point.
In order to confirm the causal theory of reference one needs to
derive from it some empirical consequences to be experimentally
tested. If one accepts that experiments must collect data about lin-
guistic usage, then in order to confirm experimentally the causal
theory of reference, one needs to derive from it some empirical
consequences concerning speakers’ linguistic performances.
The idea that experiments can be designed to confirm the causal
theory of reference by testing speakers’ linguistic performances
presupposes that one can derive predictions about speakers’ lin-
guistic performances in the experimental settings from the causal
theory of reference. Very roughly, it is presupposed that the follow-
ing methodological principle makes sense:
The causal theory of reference T predicts that in experimental
settings C competent speakers will utter U or will understand U
in a certain way (say by responding to it by uttering U⁄ or by doing
X). Therefore, if in experimental settings C speakers utter U or
understand U in that way, the theory T is confirmed. If in condi-
tions C, speakers do not utter U or do not understand U in that
way, the theory T is disconfirmed. Similarly, if T predicts that
speakers will not utter U or will not understand U in a certain
way but they do so, that disconfirms T; if speakers do not under-
stand, that confirms T.
We claim that this methodological principle suffers from a
problem. The problem is that the causal theory of reference—and
in general all philosophical theories of reference—do not make
any predictions about linguistic usage if taken separately from
pragmatic assumptions. Linguistic usage consists of speakers’ per-
formances in the production and understanding of sounds and
signs in communication exchanges. What speakers say, write or
do in order to perform linguistic acts and in response to them
depends on their conceptions and representations of the context
of utterance, the topic of the conversation, background informa-
tion, expectations about the hearer (speaker) and, of course, their
(implicit) knowledge of pragmatic maxims, i.e., general principles
governing cooperative behaviour. Even in the very simplified,
5 Original Italian version of the probe: ‘‘Immagina di essere un investigatore. Le
persone per cui lavori ti chiedono di rintracciare l’autore del famoso quadro La donna
sulla spiaggia, il giovane Marco Salvi. Mentre conduci le tue ricerche scopri che in
realtà il vero autore de La donna sulla spiaggia non è Marco Salvi, ma l’ormai
ottantenne Eugenio Marini”.
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those simulated by experimentalists when they carry out their
tests, it is not possible to make predictions about the participants’
linguistic performances from the causal theory of reference alone.
In particular, one cannot derive from the causal theory of reference
that in the experimental settings C participants will perform cer-
tain linguistic acts, unless one makes a crucial assumption about
the participants’ pragmatic processes involved in the understand-
ing and representation of the settings and the question tasks of
the experiments. That crucial assumption regards the distinction
between semantic reference and speaker’s reference.
The causal theory of reference for proper names is a theory of
their semantic reference. It is not a theory of how speakers use
proper names. Of course, as Kripke (1977) taught us, there is a fun-
damental connection between semantic reference and use. When a
speaker uses sincerely and literally a proper name, she has the gen-
eral semantic intention to use the name to refer to its semantic
bearer. However, the speaker has also a specific intention to make
a reference to a particular object. As Kripke said, in simple cases,
the two intentions coincide. But in complex cases, the two inten-
tions might be different. The speaker may have an object in mind
she wants to refer to, but that object may not be the semantic
bearer of the name. If the speaker believes erroneously that her
specific intention and her general semantic intention determine
the same object, she will misuse the name to refer to that object,
although that object is not the semantic bearer of the name. In such
a case, the object referred to is the speaker’s reference. In Kripke’s
famous example, a speaker looking at Smith in the distance and
misidentifying him for Jones can say ‘‘Jones is raking leaves” and
use the name ‘‘Jones” to make reference to Smith. Likewise, a
hearer who knows that the man in the distance is Smith and not
Jones will understand that the speaker made reference to Smith
and said of Smith that he was raking leaves, despite the fact that
the speaker uttered the name ‘‘Jones” and Smith is not its semantic
reference.
The distinction between semantic reference and speaker’s refer-
ence gives rise to a problem for experimentalists who want to con-
firm a theory of reference by testing linguistic usage. In particular,
experiments need to keep the simple cases in which the specific
intention coincides with the general semantic one apart from the
complex cases in which the two intentions diverge. For the sake
of brevity, let us call the simple cases in which the specific inten-
tion coincides with the general semantic one, cases in which the
linguistic performances are guided by the semantic reference, and
the complex cases in which the specific intention diverges from
the general semantic one, cases in which the linguistic perfor-
mances are guided by the speaker’s reference.
To make the problem clear, consider the following case. Sup-
pose that the causal theory of reference says that the semantic
reference of the proper name ‘‘N” is the object o. If experiments
show that in the experimental settings participants do not use
‘‘N” to refer to o or do not understand utterances of ‘‘N” as refer-
ring to o, this does not disconfirm the causal theory of reference.
Likewise, finding out that participants use ‘‘N” to refer to o or
understand utterances of ‘‘N” as referring to o does not confirm
the causal theory of reference either. One gets a disconfirmation
and respectively a confirmation of the causal theory of reference
only if the participants’ linguistic performances are guided by
the semantic reference. This means that linguistic performances
count as evidence for or against the causal theory of reference
only if there is evidence that they have been guided by the
semantic reference.
One way to cope with this problem is to bite the bullet and
agree that it is not possible to derive predictions about speakers’
linguistic performances directly from the causal theory of refer-
ence. However, from the causal theory of reference it is possibleto derive predictions about speakers’ linguistic performances in
the following conditional form:
Nomic conditional: in the experimental settings C, if the partici-
pants’ linguistic performances are guided by the semantic refer-
ence, then the participants will/won’t utter U or will/won’t
understand U in a certain way.
In the next sections, we will present a series of experiments
aimed at testing conditionals of this form with respect to people
proper names and geographical proper names. In Section 3, one
experiment on people proper names will be presented. In Section 4
we will argue that, although this experiment is defective since it
does not solve completely the problem of the semantic/speaker’s
reference ambiguity, it provides data that are nonetheless suffi-
cient to confirm the causal theory of reference for people proper
names. In Section 5 we will present a second study that solves
the problem of the semantic/speaker’s reference ambiguity. This
study not only replicates the results of the previous experiment
with respect to people proper names, but it confirms the causal
theory of reference also for geographical proper names.
3. Experiment 1: People proper names
The goal of Experiment 1 is to confirm the causal theory of ref-
erence testing linguistic usage with people proper names (PNs).
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Thirty-one students from the University of Genoa (Italy)
([M = 24.7; SD = 3.8; 17 males, 13 females) participated as volun-
teers or for course credits. Participants were all native Italian
speakers. Only one participant was excluded from the sample
because of an interruption in the task performance. None of them
was aware of the goal of the experiment. Informed consent was
obtained from every participant. Participants were randomly
assigned to two groups: A and B.
3.1.2. Stimuli
We created 15 written scenarios (1 practice trial + 6 target
scenarios + 8 fillers). The scenarios presented fictional ordinary
circumstances. Each scenario consisted of a story, a question and
three pictures.
The stories in the target scenarios presented fictional circum-
stances in which a description, e.g., ‘‘the painter of The Woman
on the Beach,” associated with a target people proper name (PN),
e.g., ‘‘Marco Salvi,” by a community of speakers, e.g., ‘‘the people
you work for,” was not satisfied by the bearer of the name and
was instead satisfied by another individual bearing another name,
e.g., ‘‘Eugenio Marini.” Here is an example:
‘‘Suppose you are a detective. The people you work for ask you
to track down the author of the famous painting The Woman on
the Beach, the young Mr. Marco Salvi. While you are conducting
your inquiries, you find out that the real painter of The Woman
on the Beach is not Marco Salvi, but the old Mr. Eugenio
Marini.”5
The stories were followed by a question asking the respondent
to assign a reference to the name. The description was made expli-
cit and presented together with the name to make the semantic
contradiction explicit and to test directly whether in reference
4 F. Domaneschi et al. / Cognition 161 (2017) 1–9assignment, participants relied more on the name and the causal
chain involving the name or on the description associated with
the name6; for example:
‘‘If you were asked to track down the painter of The Woman on
the Beach, Mr. Marco Salvi, who would you look for?”7
The question was then followed by three pictures representing
three alternatives: (i) the reference satisfying the description (i.e.,
the descriptive option); (ii) the reference of the name (i.e., the causal
option); and (iii) a covered box as Other option meaning ‘‘Either
both or neither of the two”—see Fig. 1.
The pictures of all the items except for the covered box were
pretested to ensure that they were proper prototypical images of
the reference of the name/description as described in the sto-
ries—e.g., picture 1 in Fig. 1 obtained a high rate in a norming study
with a 5-point Likert scale where this picture was presented and
the participants were asked to rate the extent to which it was
representative of a younger man. Moreover, the position of the
pictures representing the causal and the descriptive options was
randomised across items.
In regard to the covered box, it is worth noting that, although it
was presented in the instructions as an ‘‘Other option” standing for
‘‘Neither of the two alternatives or both of them,” the only mean-
ingful interpretation of this option in the target items was ‘‘Both
of them” since the two pictures available represented the only
two possible references for the name/description pair.
The 8 filler items had a structure similar to the target items with
the only difference being that they were designed in such a way
that: (i) two of them forced the alternative on the left (i.e., picture
1); (ii) two forced the one on the right (i.e., picture 3); (iii) two
forced the other option because pictures 1 and 3 presented equally
plausible alternatives; and (iv) two forced the other option because
pictures 1 and 3 presented equally implausible alternatives. In this
way, the 8 filler items worked as both distractor and control
items.8
As an independent variable, we manipulated the relevance of the
description associated with the target name with respect to the fic-
tional context of the story by including a sentence intended to
increase the relevance of the description. For example, the rele-
vance of the description ‘‘the painter of The Woman on the Beach”
was increased/manipulated by including the following sentence
(marked in italics) in the question:
If you were asked to track down the painter of ‘‘The Woman on
the Beach,” Mr. Marco Salvi, in order to ask him to produce a sim-
ilar painting, who would you look for?9
All the critical sentences embedded in the questions to increase
the relevance of the description were pretested with a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire administered to 16 participants. In the ques-
tionnaire, participants were presented a question asking about
the likelihood of the relation between the critical sentence and
the description associated with the name. Participants rated the6 The position of name/description was randomised across the items in order to
avoid any possible effect due to their syntactic position, for example: (i) the
postposition of the description with respect to the name that could lead to
interpreting the name as the focus of the sentence forcing a causal interpretation
or (ii) any other potential effect of the appositive construction.
7 Original Italian version of the question in the Standard condition: ‘‘Se ti venisse
chiesto di rintracciare l’autore di La donna sulla spiaggia Marco Salvi, chi cercheresti
tra i due?”
8 All the participants reached a 50% + 1 correctness level for the filler questions
contained in the filler items. Consequently, no participant was excluded from the
sample for having violated this accuracy criterion.
9 Original Italian version of the question in the Relevance condition: ‘‘Se ti venisse
chiesto di rintracciare l’autore de La donna sulla spiaggia Marco Salvi, per far dipingere
un quadro simile a La donna sulla spiaggia, chi cercheresti tra i due?”probability of the event described by the critical sentence p from
1, very unlikely, to 5, very likely. Sentences that obtained 5 were
selected as critical sentences.
By manipulating the relevance of the description with the crit-
ical sentence, we created a between-subject design where two
groups of participants were randomly assigned to either a Standard
condition or a Relevance condition. As argued above, it is not possi-
ble to test linguistic usage by excluding the role played by prag-
matic factors. In reference assignment, a crucial role is typically
played by the degree of relevance of the potential referents
(Clark, 2013; Wilson, 1992). We introduced the relevance condi-
tion as a control condition to verify the influence of pragmatic vari-
ables in reference assignment. Our expectation was that the high
degree of relevance of the description associated with the name
would prompt participants to select the descriptive reference.
3.1.3. Procedure
The task consisted of reading the stories and answering the
questions by selecting the picture that best represented the refer-
ence for the target name. The order of the trials was randomised.
The experiment was run as a paper-pencil questionnaire. Partici-
pants were tested individually at the Laboratory of Psychology of
Language at the University of Genoa (Italy) in a quiet room with
normal lighting.
The experiment started with written instructions informing
participants that they were expected to read stories containing a
name and select between two pictures the one corresponding to
what they considered to be the reference of the name (or the Other
option if they considered both alternatives plausible or neither of
them). An example was then given, followed by a practice trial.
Participants were instructed to read the stories only once. Partici-
pants spent around 180 to complete the task. During the debriefing
phase, no participant was found to have been aware of the goal of
the experiment or to have identified the target items among the
list of 14 stories.
As the experiment was run in paper-and-pencil, participants’
responses were manually decoded by a first coder and then
checked by a second coder and corrected if necessary.
3.1.4. Dependent variable
We were interested in investigating: (i) any eventual difference
in percentages of choices per condition and (ii) any eventual differ-
ence in percentages of choices across conditions. Our main depen-
dent variable was therefore the percentages of participants’
choices in the target items within and across the two experimental
settings.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Results within condition
For both the Standard condition and Relevance condition, partic-
ipants could provide their answer by choosing between a causal
option, a descriptive option, or neither of them by selecting the
other option possibility. Although in both conditions the differences
in percentages of the possible options were clear-cut, we ran a chi-
square analysis separately per condition to statistically compare
the difference between the available options. Moreover, in order
to avoid a Type I error, we applied Yates’s continuity correction
to the Pearson’s chi-squared test. In what follows, the test statistics
with Yates’ correction are reported.
In the Standard condition, our participants chose the causal
option 57.77% of the time and the descriptive one 26.66% of the
time, while they selected the other option possibility only 15.55%
of the time. The Chi-square statistics confirmed that there was a
significant difference between (i) the causal and the descriptive
options (v2 (1) = 41.61; p < 0.001); (ii) the causal and the other
Fig. 1. Example of three pictures attached to a target scenario. Picture 1 (left) represents the reference of the name ‘‘Marco Salvi”; picture 3 (right) represents the reference of
the description ‘‘The painter of The Woman on the Beach”; picture 2, the covered box (centre), stands for the ‘‘Other option.”
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other option (v2 (1) = 4.52; p < 0.05).
In the Relevance condition, participants selected the causal inter-
pretation 16.66% of the time, and the descriptive one 66.66% of the
time, while they chose the other option 16.66% of the time. The
Chi-square statistics confirmed that, while the difference between
the causal interpretation and the other option was not significant
(v2 (1) = 1.84; p = n.s.), the percentage of choice for the descriptive
option was significantly higher than that of the causal option (v2
(1) = 27.7; p < 0.001) and that of the other option preference (v2
(1) = 27.7; p < 0.001).
Overall, the results within condition suggest a reversed pattern
of preference: when presented within a Standard context, people
proper names were significantly given a causal interpretation but
when they were supported by a Relevance context, participants
substantially preferred a descriptive interpretation.Fig. 2. Comparison of the percentage of choices in the Standard and Relevance
condition with PNs3.2.2. Results across conditions
The above trend of results was further confirmed in the across-
conditions comparison. Statistical analysis was performed with
Linear Mixed Models (LMM) using the lme4 package (Bates et al.,
2015) and the lmerTest package to extend the lmer model and pro-
vide the degrees of freedom and the p-value. The random structure
of the model was constructed by using subjects and items as ran-
dom factors (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008), while participants’
responses in the two conditions (i.e., Standard vs. Relevance) con-
stituted the fixed structure of the model. The results revealed a sig-
nificant effect of condition (t = 2.81, df = 1, p < 0.01), further
confirming the reversed pattern of choices between the causal
and descriptive option in the two conditions (see Fig. 2). In fact,
while people proper names were significantly given a causal inter-
pretation in the Standard condition (57.77% of the time vs. 16.66%
in the Relevance condition), they were interpreted descriptively
when presented within a Relevance context (66.66% of the time
vs. 26.66% in the Standard condition), which suggests that their
interpretation was influenced by the degree of relevance of the
description.4. Partial confirmation of the causal theory of reference
In this section, we will argue that our experimental data provide
a confirmation of the causal theory of reference for people proper
names.
In light of what we said in Section 2, what can be predicted from
the causal theory of reference is the nomic conditional that, in our
experimental settings, if participants understand names as refer-
ring to their semantic reference, then they choose the causal
options. Therefore, finding out that participants chose the causal
option does not count as a confirmation of the theory. Those find-ings do not confirm the causal theory of reference unless there are
reasons to believe that participants interpreted the names as refer-
ring to their semantic reference. Likewise, finding out that partici-
pants chose the descriptive option does not count as a
disconfirmation of the causal theory of reference. Such findings
count as a disconfirmation of the causal theory of reference only
if there are reasons to rule out the possibility that participants
interpreted the names as referring to the speaker’s reference.
In interpreting our experimental data, then, we need to take
into account both the possibility that semantic reference guided
participants’ choices and the possibility that the speaker’s refer-
ence guided them.
First, the results confirm the causal theory of reference for peo-
ple proper names because the participants’ primary choice in the
standard condition was the causal option, i.e., the bearer of the
name. The point is that we have reasons to believe that it was
the semantic reference that guided the participants’ choices. In
fact, from the point of view of the causal theory of reference, the
only candidate consistent with the semantic reference was the
causal option, while the descriptive option was the only candidate
for the speaker’s reference. Since we have evidence that the
semantic reference guided the participants’ choices, we have evi-
dence that the antecedent of the nomic conditional is true. Our
experimental data provide evidence that the consequent is true
as well. Therefore, the prediction that if the semantic reference
guides reference assignment, then the participants choose the
bearer of the name (causal option) and not the satisfier of
the description (descriptive option), is verified. The prediction of
10 Original Italian version of the probe: ‘‘In Svezia la città di Yalmo è nota come la
località della battaglia dei 99 giorni. Scopri che in realtà la battaglia dei 99 giorni non
è stata combattuta a Yalmo bensì nella piccola vicina isola di Grund
11 Original Italian version of the question: ‘‘Se ti chiedessero di recarti a Yalmo, la
località della battaglia dei 99 giorni, dove andresti?”
6 F. Domaneschi et al. / Cognition 161 (2017) 1–9the causal theory of reference, in the form of the nomic conditional,
is confirmed. This confirms the causal theory of reference with
regard to people proper names. An important issue, however,
remains open: although the majority of the participants opted for
the causal option, it might be the case that the participants who
opted for the descriptive option were guided by the speaker’s ref-
erence. In such a case, the causal theory would be even more
strongly confirmed.
In the next section, we will present a second study that resolves
the problem of the semantic/speaker’s reference ambiguity. It
allows for separating the descriptive responses guided by the
speaker’s reference from those guided by the semantic reference
as predicted by the classical descriptivist theory. Finding out that
the choice of the descriptive option was guided by the speaker’s
reference will give the causal theory of reference a stronger confir-
mation. Indeed, the conditional prediction will be confirmed in its
counterposed form: if participants choose the descriptive options,
then they are not guided by the semantic reference.




61. Italian students (University of Genoa - Italy) participated as
volunteers [M = 29.4; SD = 7.6; 23 males, 38 females]. Participants
were all native Italian speakers. Informed consent was obtained
from every participant.
5.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
Similar to Experiment1,wecreated16written scenarios. The tar-
get scenarios had a similar structure as those used in the previous
experiment. Thefiller/control scenarioswere structured as in Exper-
iment 1. One difference with respect to Experiment 1 was that we
included in the sameexperiment5 target stories testing geographical
proper names (GNs) and 5 target stories testing people proper names.
Although, as we will explain in Section 5.2, the methodology
used in this experiment allows us to test the causal theory of ref-
erence by investigating linguistic usage and in spite of the poten-
tial interference of pragmatic variables, because it allows us to
distinguish between the participants’ responses that were guided
by the semantic reference from those that were guided by the
speaker’s reference, we have nonetheless attempted to reduce
the interference of pragmatic variables. Since the Relevance condi-
tion in Experiment 1 revealed that when the pragmatic variable of
the relevance of the description associated with a name was
increased, participants were prompted to select the descriptive
option, in our second experiment we pretested all the descriptions
associated with both people and geographical proper names
through a norming study. Descriptions were pretested with an
online questionnaire administered to 21 participants. In the ques-
tionnaire, participants were asked to rate the likelihood of the
event that someone could visit a place (testing GNs) or look for a
person (testing PNs), given the content of the description associ-
ated with the name. For example, to test the relevance of the
description ‘‘the birthplace of the musician Francois Morrie” asso-
ciated with the geographical name ‘‘Calè,” we asked, ‘‘How likely is
it that someone visits a certain city for the only fact that it is a
musician’s birthplace?” Participants rated the probability of the
described event on a 5-point Likert scale, from 1, very unlikely,
to 5, very likely. The purpose of the norming study was twofold:
first, to balance the level of the relevance of the descriptions; sec-
ond, to make sure our stimuli received a low degree of relevance.
The descriptions that obtained, on average, a score between 1
and 2 were therefore selected for the experiment.Furthermore, with respect to Experiment 1, the structure of the
stories was reduced in order to avoid the potential interference of
other pragmatic variables. For example, one of the stories used
with GNs was:
‘‘In Sweden the city of Yalmo is known as the place of the 99-
days battle. You find out that, actually, the 99-days battle was
not fought in Yalmo but in the small close island of Grund”10
As in the previous experiments, stories were followed by a
question asking the respondent to assign a reference to the name,
for example:
QUESTION 1:
‘‘If you were asked to go to Yalmo, the place of the 99-days bat-
tle, where would you go?”11
The question was then followed by two pre-tested pictures: (i) a
picture representing the satisfier of the description (i.e., the
descriptive option) and (ii) a picture representing the causal refer-
ence of the name (i.e., the causal option) (see Fig. 3).
Different from Experiment 1, in this experiment the first ques-
tion was then followed by a second one, prompting a production
task asking participants to name the chosen place. For example:
QUESTION 2:
‘‘Suppose you visited the place you chose. You would say you have
been to:”




‘‘Yalmo” is name1 whose bearer does not satisfy the description,
while ‘‘Grund” is name2 whose bearer satisfies the description.
5.1.3. Procedure
The experiment was run online. The procedure consisted of two
tasks:
Task 1—Selection Task: selecting the picture, out of two, that best
represents the reference of the target name.
Task 2—Elicited Production Task: selecting the name, between
name1 and name2, that best reports the choice in Task 1.
5.2. Rationale of the study
Experiment 2 had two tasks. In Task 1, there were two options:
the causal option and the descriptive option. In Task 2, participants
were asked to select a name to report their choice in Task 1 and
they were given two alternatives: name1 and name2. The depen-
dent variable of this study was the frequency of response pairs in
Task 1 and Task 2. In other words, the experiment investigated
the frequency of the four possible combinations of responses in
the two tasks. Let us elaborate on the rationale of our methodology.
Responses in the two tasks resulted in four possible combinations:
causal option/name1, causal option/name2, descriptive option/name1
and descriptive option/name2.
Causal option/name1: if the participants selected the causal
option in Task 1, e.g., the city of Yalmo, and they reported their
choice using name1 in Task 2, the name ‘‘Yalmo,” then we have evi-
dence for the causal theory of reference. The selection of the causal
Fig. 3. Example of two pictures attached to a target scenario with GNs. Picture 1 (left) represents the satisfier of the description; picture 2 (right) represents the reference of
the name ‘‘Yalmo.”
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‘‘Yalmo” the reference predicted by the causal theory. In reporting
their choice using the name ‘‘Yalmo” in Task 2, moreover, they give
evidence that they take the city of Yalmo to be the semantic refer-
ence of the name ‘‘Yalmo.” This confirms the nomic conditional
predicted by the causal theory of reference.
Causal option/name2: if the participants selected the causal
option in Task 1, e.g., the city of Yalmo, and they reported their
choice with name2 in Task 2, the name ‘‘Grund,” then we have evi-
dence that they did not understand the scenario, in which the
name ‘‘Grund” referred to the island of Grund and not to the city
of Yalmo. This combination of responses represents therefore a
control option, used to assess participants’ comprehension of the
task and their accuracy in the performance.
Descriptive option/name1: if participants selected the descriptive
option in Task 1, e.g., the island of Grund, and they opted for name1,
the name ‘‘Yalmo,” then we have evidence against the causal the-
ory of reference. In this case, participants took the name ‘‘Yalmo”
as referring to the island of Grund in Task 1, which is the satisfier
of the description associated with the name ‘‘Yalmo.” Afterwards,
participants used the name ‘‘Yalmo” to refer to the island of Grund
in Task 2. In doing so, they showed that they took the island of
Grund to be the semantic reference of the name ‘‘Yalmo.” This
makes the nomic conditional false. The participants’ linguistic per-
formances were guided by the semantic reference, and they chose
the descriptive option.
Descriptive option/name2: if participants selected the descriptive
option in Task 1, e.g., the island of Grund, and reported their choice
using name2 in Task 2, the name ‘‘Grund,” then we have evidence
that confirms the causal theory of reference. Although participants
chose the descriptive option, they show that their choice was
guided by the speaker’s reference. They understood the use of
the name ‘‘Yalmo” in Task 1 as referring to the speaker’s reference.
The conditional prediction of the causal theory of reference is con-
firmed in its counterposed form: if participants chose the descrip-
tive option, then their choice is not guided by the semantic
reference.1212 Someone could argue that a third legitimate way to report the participants’ choice
in Task 1 would be to use the description itself, e.g., ‘‘I’ve visited the place where the
99-days battle took place.” We decided, however, to exclude this third option from
Task 2 because it is not directly informative about whether participants are using the
name ‘‘Yalmo” consistently with the causal theory. For example: in Task 1,
participants select the picture consistent with the causal option, e.g., they opt for
picture 2 on the right in Fig. 3 representing the city of Yalmo as referent of the proper
name ‘‘Yalmo,” and in Task 2 they describe the option selected in Task 1 using the
description ‘‘the place where the 99-days battle took place,” the combination of
responses is totally inconsistent. The description, in fact, does not fit at all with the
causal option in Task 1. Consider moreover the case in which participants in Task 1
select the picture consistent with the descriptive option, e.g., picture 1 on the left in
Fig. 3 representing the island, and in Task 2, they report their choice using the
description ‘‘the place where the 99-days battle took place.” In this case, this
combination of responses would be totally uninformative: the fact they are using the
description ‘‘the place where the 99-days battle took place” to refer to the island does
not allow one to determine if in Task 1 they have been guided by the semantic
reference or by the speaker’s reference.5.3. Results
In Experiment 2, we investigated any eventual difference in
combination responses (i) between PNs and GNs and (ii) for PNs
and GNs separately.5.3.1. Results
Linear Mixed Models comparing the frequency of response
combinations between PNs and GNs (random factors: subject,
items; fixed factor: semantic domain) revealed that the two
semantic domains significantly differed (t = 2.73 df = 1;
p < 0.006)—see Fig. 4 for mean frequencies in percentage.
For PNs, the chi-square statistics with Yates’ continuity correc-
tion revealed that the response combination causal option/name1
significantly differed from causal option/name2 (v2 (1) = 210.25;
p < 0.0001), from descriptive option/name1 (v2 (1) = 158.42;
p < 0.0001) and from Descriptive option/name2 (v2 (1) = 41.64;
p < 0.0001). Causal option/name2 significantly differed from both
descriptive option/name1 (v2 (1) = 8.53; p < 0.05) and descriptive
option/name2 (v2 (1) = 82.47; p < 0.0001). Finally, descriptive
option/name1 significantly differed from descriptive option/name2
(v2 (1) = 44.94; p < 0.0001). These results suggest that the primary
choice was the response combination causal option/name1.
For GNs, results suggest a different pattern: descriptive option/-
name2 was selected as the primary choice. Descriptive option/name2
significantly differed from causal option/ name1 (v2 (1) = 17.67;
p < 0.0001), from descriptive option/name1 (v2 (1) = 74.58;
p < 0.0001) and from causal option/name2 (v2 (1) = 169.81;
p < 0.0001). Causal option/name1 significantly differed from both
causal option/name2 (v2 (1) = 90.44; p < 0.0001) and descriptive
option/name1 (v2 (1) = 20.64; p < 0.0001). Finally, causal option/-
name2 significantly differed from descriptive option/name1 (v2 (1)
= 30.96; p < 0.0001).Fig. 4. Mean frequencies in percentage of response combinations x response type
(CR: Causal option, DR: descriptive option) and semantic domain.
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We will now analyse our data and show that they confirm the
causal theory of reference. Data about PNs reveal that participants
opted for the combination causal option/name1 in a significant
majority of the responses. This result provides evidence in favour
of the causal theory of reference. When participants were asked
to assign a reference to the proper name in Task 1, they primarily
assigned the semantic reference predicted by the causal theory of
reference. Moreover, their responses to Task 2 show that their
choice was guided by the semantic reference. The significant low
percentage of selection of the combination causal option/name2
guarantees the high level of accuracy of the participants’ perfor-
mances. Another important result about PNs emerges clearly from
Experiment 2: the combination descriptive option/name2 was
selected significantly more frequently than the combination
descriptive option/name1. As argued in Section 5.2, these data reveal
that participants were guided by the speaker’s reference in select-
ing the descriptive option in Task 1. This result gives more
evidence in support of the causal theory of reference and strength-
ens the evidence given in Experiment 1. We can conclude therefore
that the causal theory of reference for PNs is confirmed.
Data about GNs show a different pattern of results. Participants
performed the experiment with high accuracy, given the signifi-
cant low percentage of responses causal option/name2, and they
opted for the combination descriptive option/name1 significantly
less frequently than the alternatives causal option/name1 and
descriptive option/name2. The primary choice with GNs has been
the combination descriptive option/name2, while the combination
causal option/name1 has been selected less frequently. The causal
theory of reference is confirmed for GNs as well. In fact, the two
most frequent choices descriptive option/name2 and causal option/
name1 show that when participants chose the descriptive option
they were guided by the speaker’s reference and when they chose
the causal option they were guided by the semantic reference, just
as it is predicted by the causal theory of reference. This verifies the
conditional prediction of the causal theory of reference.
If we compare the results of Experiments 1 with the results of
Experiment 2, we can conclude that Experiment 2 not only repli-
cates the data from Experiments 1, but it also confirms the hypoth-
esis that the majority of participants that in Experiments 1 opted
for the descriptive option were not guided by the descriptivist
semantic reference but by the speaker’s reference. This result pro-
vides a stronger confirmation of the causal theory of reference for
both PNs and GNs.7. Differences across semantic domains
A secondary but interesting result that emerged from Experi-
ment 2 is that the semantic domain of a name affects reference
assignment. As to PNs, participants opted for causal option/name1
as their primary choice and for descriptive option/name2 as their
secondary option, while they showed the opposite trend of
responses with GNs, where descriptive option/name2 was the first
choice and causal option/name1 the second choice. Although our
results revealed no semantic difference between PNs and GNs—
the causal theory was confirmed for both—it did reveal a pragmatic
difference. Where the hearer knows that the description a speaker
associates with a name does not fit its semantic referent, the hearer
is significantly more likely with a GN than with a PN to take the
speaker to be referring to the object fitting the description rather
than to the semantic referent. This pragmatic effect of the semantic
domain of a name is surprising.
From a very strict psycholinguistic point of view, we can only
register this difference across semantic domains. The reason whyreference assignment tends to be guided by the semantic reference
with PNs and by the speaker’s reference with GNs may be due to
anthropological, sociological and ontological aspects. Such an
explanation might have to do with the kinds of objects we speak
of when using PNs and GNs: speakers use names to refer to differ-
ent kinds of things, to which they attribute different kinds of inter-
ests, expectations and values. Further works, however, should be
designed to better investigate this second result.8. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a method for assessing exper-
imentally the causal theory of reference by testing linguistic usage.
Although Experiment 1 revealed an interesting pattern of results,
the collected data confirmed only partially the causal theory of ref-
erence due to the semantic/speaker’s reference ambiguity. In
Experiment 2, we proposed a method to resolve this ambiguity.
The data collected in Experiment 2 confirmed the causal theory
of reference for people proper names and geographical proper
names.
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